CYBERSECURITY OF THE PERSON
Jeff Kosseff
ABSTRACT
U.S. cybersecurity law is largely an outgrowth of the early-aughts
concerns over identity theft and financial fraud. Cybersecurity
laws focus on protecting identifiers such as driver’s licenses and
social security numbers, and financial data such as credit card
numbers. Federal and state laws require companies to protect
this data and notify individuals when it is breached, and impose
civil and criminal liability on hackers who steal or damage this
data.
This Article argues that our current cybersecurity laws are too
narrowly focused on financial harms. While such concerns
remain valid, they are only one facet of the cybersecurity
challenge that our nation faces. The cybersecurity profession too
often overlooks the harm to individuals, such as revenge
pornography and online harassment. Accounting for such harms
in our conception of cybersecurity will help to better align our
laws with these threats. This Article explains how a broadened
understanding of cybersecurity can inform our laws regarding
data breach notification, security requirements, and computer
hacking.
INTRODUCTION
The RSA Conference in San Francisco is the
cybersecurity industry’s most prominent annual gathering,
bringing together thousands of leaders from the corporate,
government, and academic worlds to discuss emerging
cyberthreats, trends, and new technologies to better secure
systems, networks, and data. 1 The conference boasts an
impressive schedule of panels and presentations, many of which
are in break-out format. 2 The most attended—and coveted—
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spots are the keynote presentations. When the RSA released the
schedule for its April 2018 conference, there was one glaring
problem: of the 20 keynote speakers, there were 19 men. 3 Monica
Lewinsky, an anti-cyber-bullying advocate, was the only female
speaker scheduled for the conference. The keynote imbalance
was noteworthy but not terribly surprising; just a few months
earlier, CES, the consumer electronics trade industry conference
in Las Vegas, hosted zero female keynoters. 4 RSA, to its credit,
quickly responded to the criticism and added more female
keynote speakers, including Homeland Security Secretary
Kirstjen Nielsen, 5 whose department is responsible for civilian
cybersecurity and had more reason to be speaking at the
conference than any other official in the United States
government.
Although RSA attempted to rectify its gender imbalance,
the initial list of keynoters speaks volumes about the
overwhelmingly male perspective that shapes the cybersecurity
field. One study estimates that women comprise only 14 percent
of the U.S. cybersecurity workforce. 6 When major conferences
such as RSA all but completely exclude female keynote speakers,
they discourage women from pursuing careers in the field. Such
exclusionary behavior is always appalling, but it also is a
significant national and economic security issue, as the
cybersecurity industry faces a dire shortage of workers. 7
The insular nature of the cybersecurity profession is more
than just a workforce issue. The leadership of the public and
private sector determines the fields’ priorities: including what we
consider to be cybersecurity threats, and how we will combat
them. The current patchwork of laws that purport to address
cybersecurity are focused largely on preventing economic harms

3

See Verne Kopytoff, Prominent Tech Conference Faces Backlash for Keynote Lineup: 19
Men, 1 Woman, FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/03/01/rsa-techconference-backlash-keynote-gendergap/?utm_content=buffer84a07&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com
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4
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(Jan. 11, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/11/ces-power-outage-tech-backlash/
(“While waiting for Ford CEO Jim Hackett’s enlightening keynote Tuesday morning
I listened to CES poo-bah Gary Shapiro mouth words about diversity. This from the
head of an organization that didn’t see fit to program one woman as a keynote
speaker at its annual event.”).
5
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Id. (“A study last year by Frost & Sullivan, a consulting firm, found that North
America will face a shortage of 265,000 cybersecurity workers by 2022.”).

2019]

CYBERSECURITY OF THE PERSON

345

such as identity theft. This Article argues that the cybersecurity
field—and its laws and policies—focus too narrowly on these
economic harms, at the exclusion of other harms that often are
disproportionately suffered by women and minority groups.
Case in point: the only woman who was initially
scheduled to deliver an RSA keynote—Lewinsky—is not the
standard RSA speaker. She is not a technology executive, nor is
she a lawmaker. Lewinsky has become one of the most
prominent advocates to address online bullying and harassment.
Lewinsky—whose name was thrown into the public spotlight via
an online gossip blog in 1998—understands these reputational
harms better than possibly anyone else in the United States; as
she put it, she was “patient zero” of the cyber-bullying era. 8
Lewinsky urged the audience to protect particularly sensitive
information that could be used against victims. “Make people
more aware of cybersecurity and how to protect themselves,
particularly the young,” she said. 9
Lewinsky’s message would not have been as impactful
coming from anyone else in the crowd of RSA regulars. Her life
experiences—some of which are well known to the public in
great detail thanks to the Internet—have shaped her unique view
on cybersecurity threats and solutions. Yet the agenda for RSA—
and the cybersecurity industry at large—is shaped by the
standard roster of technology executives, hacking whizzes, and
government officials. Voices such as Lewinsky’s have largely
been left out of our discussions about what it means to secure
cyberspace. And it shows.
This Article ultimately argues that the legal system must
broaden its focus on cybersecurity to include non-economic
harms, such as online harassment, cyberbullying, and revenge
pornography. Part I examines the types of personal harms that
individuals face in cyberspace, and argues that the current system
of civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions does not sufficiently
deter bad actors, in part because of the First Amendment
protections for online speech. Part II provides an overview of the
current framework of statutes, regulations, and that broadly
encompasses cybersecurity law, and argues that these laws do
not adequately cover many of the personal harms. It suggests
improvements and modernizations to cybersecurity law to better
protect individual rights.
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(Apr. 18, 2018, 9:30 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/monica-lewinsky-askscybersecurity-pros-to-aid-the-vulnerable/.
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I. CYBER THREATS TO THE PERSON
The term “cybersecurity” is often associated with whitehat and black-hat hackers engaging in digital battles against one
another in a battle to protect servers, confidential trade secrets,
and cyber-physical systems. 10 To be sure, such national security
and macroeconomic concerns are pervasive—and legitimate.
Too often overlooked, however, are the harms that individuals
face, stemming not only from attempts to steal their money, but
also pervasive harassment and hateful online activities. States
have increasingly passed statutes to address cyberbullying and
revenge pornography, though these admirable efforts have
encountered some First Amendment challenges and other
obstacles. This Part argues that while these after-the-fact
remedies are an important component of fighting cyberthreats to
the person, they are not sufficient.
Perhaps the most comprehensive look at these individual
harms was Danielle Citron’s 2014 book, Hate Crimes in
Cyberspace. Citron succinctly describes the wide range of
individual harms that exist in cyberspace:
Cyber harassment involves threats
of violence, privacy invasions,
reputation-harming lies, calls for
strangers to physically harm
victims, and technological attacks.
Victims’ in-boxes are inundated
with threatening e-mails. Their
employers receive anonymous emails accusing them of misdeeds.
Fake online advertisements list
victims’ contact information and
availability for sex. Their nude
photos appear on sites devoted to
exacting revenge. On message
boards and blogs, victims are falsely
accused of
having
sexually
transmitted infections, criminal
records, and mental illnesses. Their
social security numbers and
medical conditions are published
for all to see. Even if some abuse is

10
See, e.g., What Is Cybersecurity?, PALO ALTO NETWORKS,
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-is-cyber-security (last visited
Mar. 1, 2019).
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taken down from a site, it quickly
reappears on others. Victims’ sites
are forced offline with distributeddenial-of-service attacks. 11
A. New Threats, New Harms
As social media and newer technology proliferates, we
learn about new ways that individuals suffer at the hands of bad
actors. Sextortion is a prime example of this trend. A 2016
Brookings report reviewed court filings to find 80 cases of
“sextortion” involving at least 3,000 victims. 12 The authors of the
report define sextortion as “old-fashioned extortion or blackmail,
carried out over a computer network, involving some threat—
generally but not always a threat to release sexually-explicit
images of the victim—if the victim does not engage in some form
of further sexual activity.” 13 The report provided a chilling
example of how sextortion works:
It started with an email from an
unknown sender with the subject
line, “Read this and be smart.”
When the victim opened the email,
she found sexually explicit photos
of herself attached and information
that detailed where she worked.
Following that were details of her
personal life: her husband and her
three kids. And there was a
demand.
The demand made this hack
different: This computer intrusion
was not about money. The
perpetrator wanted a pornographic
video of the victim. And if she did
not send it within one day, he
threatened to publish the images
already in his possession, and “let
[her] family know about [her] dark

11

DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 3–4 (2016).
Benjamin Wittes et al., Sextortion: Cybersecurity, Teenagers, and Remote Sexual Assault,
CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION BROOKINGS (May 11, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/sextortion-cybersecurity-teenagers-andremote-sexual-assault/.
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side.” If she contacted law
enforcement, he promised he would
publish the photos on the Internet
too.
Later in the day, to underscore his
seriousness, the hacker followed up
with another email threatening the
victim: “You have six hours.”
This
victim
knew
her
correspondent only as
yosoylammer@hotmail.com, but
the attacker turned out to be a
talented 32-year-old proficient in
multiple
computer
languages.
Located in Santa Ana, California,
his name was Luis Mijangos.
On
November
5,
2009,
yosolammer@hotmail.com sent an
email to another woman with the
subject line: “who hacked your
account READ it!!!” In the email,
Mijangos attached a naked photo of
the victim and told her “im [sic] in
control of your computers right
now.” 14
B. Barriers to Common-Law Claims
Victims of revenge pornography, cyber-harassment,
cyber-bullying, sextortion, and other highly personal
cyberattacks face a tough road if they want to hold bad actors
liable. Consider, for instance, the case of Alyssa Backlund. In
2009, Christopher Stone posted a picture of a girl on his website,
StickyDrama.com. Alongside the picture was a description
claiming that the photo “appears to depict Alyssa Marie
Robertson masturbating next to an infant. Such an act, in
addition to being morally repugnant, probably violates several
statutes pertaining to exposing children to obscenity.” 15 Stone
posted Backlund’s contact information alongside the image,
even though Backlund was not the person in the photo. 16 The
14

Id. at 1.
Backlund v. Stone, No. B235173, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6467, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2012).
16
Id.
15
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post was viewed thousands of times. Visitors commented the
Backlund was a “whore,” and contacted her directly. 17 Backlund
allegedly contacted a friend of Stone. A few months later, after
obtaining a topless picture of Backlund, Stone publicly tweeted
to her, “[m]essage him again, and your floppy titties are
spammed all over the place. Last warning.” 18 Backlund claims
that Stone filed a defamation lawsuit against her in small claims
court but did not serve it, and that he encouraged the visitors to
his website to campaign for his case to be heard on Judge Judy.19
After Stone had threatened Backlund on Twitter, Backlund had
been pseudonymously quoted in a Gawker article entitled
“StickyDrama’s Christopher Stone is a ‘Sextortion’ Expert in
More Ways Than One.’” 20 Quoted as “Sarah,” Backlund stated,
“[h]e scares me shitless . . . he’ll take anything he can to smash
you.” 21 Backlund sued Stone for defamation and false light
invasion of privacy, and her claim survived an initial motion to
strike, and Stone did not appeal the denial. 22
But that was not the end of the legal wrangling for
Backlund. After he lost his motion to strike, he sued Backlund
for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from the Gawker article. 23 Stone claimed to protect
“naïve and unsuspecting [Internet] users [who] are easy prey to
sex offenders[.]” 24 Stone disputed the claim that he had
committed sextortion. 25 “I did not engage in `sextortion' because
I never demanded that Backlund send me additional topless
photos or any money or property in exchange for refraining from
posting her photograph,” he wrote in a declaration. 26 Backlund
moved to strike the claims under California’s anti-SLAPP
statute. 27 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the
subject of the claims was not a public interest matter, but rather
Backlund’s “own comments, regarding an individual experience,
concerning alleged threats” by Stone. 28 The allegations of
Backlund “blindly answering questions about one’s individual
experience, without any awareness of the author’s intended topic
of the publication, distinguishes it from others described in

17
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published opinions, where defendants themselves speak on
issues of public interest,” the trial court reasoned. 29
The California Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the
motion to strike, concluding that Backlund’s statements to
Gawker “were a public comment about a publicly disseminated
threat against her made by public figure Stone.” 30 Although
Backlund ultimately escaped liability, she was forced to not only
litigate her defamation claim against Stone, but to defend against
his counter-claims in two different courts. Backlund’s case
demonstrates the difficulty that victims face in using commonlaw remedies such as defamation and privacy torts. The
extensive litigation, uncertainty, significant personal legal risks,
and public attention serve as a strong disincentive for a victim to
bring such civil litigation, even in cases that involve appalling
facts.
C. Addressing New Harms Via Statute
Recognizing the limits of common law torts, many states
have passed statutes that specifically address cyberbullying,
revenge pornography, cyberstalking, and online harassment. But
even these statutes, which provide criminal or civil penalties,
have faced constitutional obstacles.
For instance, North Carolina’s state legislature enacted a
statute that made it “unlawful for any person to use a computer
or computer network to . . . [p]ost or encourage others to post on
the Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining
to a minor” “[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a
minor.” 31 A male North Carolina high school student posted on
Facebook a text message that a classmate had accidentally sent
him. 32 Robert Bishop, who also attended the same high school,
commented below the post that the message was “excessively
homoerotic.” 33 Other classmates posted similar comments. 34 The
mother of the boy who was the subject of the Facebook post
found him in his room, hysterically crying. 35 After viewing the
Facebook post, she called the police, which launched the
investigation. 36 Bishop and other students involved in the
Facebook comments were charged under the North Carolina

29

Id.
Id.
31
State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14458.1 (2015)).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 816.
36
Id.
30
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cyberbullying law. 37 After Bishop’s conviction, he appealed,
arguing that the statute violates the First Amendment. 38
Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected his
appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court in 2016 agreed with
Bishop that the cyberbullying statute was unconstitutional. 39 The
Court reasoned that the cyberbullying statute “restricts speech,
and not just nonexpressive conduct; that the restriction created
is content based, not content neutral; and that the statute’s scope
is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the State’s asserted
interest in protecting children from the harms resulting from
online bullying.” 40 Although the state’s goal to prevent
cyberbullying is “laudable,” the Court wrote, the North Carolina
law “‘create[s] a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.’” 41
Likewise, Albany County, N.Y., passed a law that
imposed misdemeanor penalties of up to a year in jail and a
$1,000 fine for the offense of cyberbullying, which it defined as:
any act of communicating or
causing a communication to be sent
by mechanical or electronic means,
including posting statements on the
internet or through a computer or
email
network,
disseminating
embarrassing or sexually explicit
photographs; disseminating private,
personal,
false
or
sexual
information, or sending hate mail,
with no legitimate private, personal,
or public purpose, with the intent to
harass, annoy, threaten, abuse,
taunt,
intimidate,
torment,
humiliate, or otherwise inflict
significant emotional harm on
another person. 42
An Albany County high school student, Marquan M.,
pseudonymously posted on Facebook detailed allegations of
classmates’ sex lives. 43 Marquan was charged under the county
cyberbullying law, and after the trial court rejected his First

37
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Id.
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Amendment objections to the law, he pleaded guilty with the
right to appeal the constitutionality. 44 On appeal, the New York
Court of Appeals agreed with Marquan, finding that the county
law was of “alarming breadth,” and that it would “criminalize a
broad spectrum of speech outside the popular understanding of
cyberbullying, including, for example: an email disclosing
private information about a corporation or a telephone
conversation meant to annoy an adult.” 45 The county
acknowledged that portions of its law were unconstitutionally
overbroad but as applied to Marquan, comported with the First
Amendment. 46 As the New York Court of Appeals characterized
the County’s position, it believed the law only applies to
“particular types of electronic communications containing
information of a sexual nature pertaining to minors and only if
the sender intends to inflict emotional harm on a child or
children.” 47 The Court refused to sever the portions of the law
that the County conceded to be unconstitutional while retaining
the remainder. 48 “[T]o accept the County’s proposed
interpretation, we would need to significantly modify the
applications of the county law, resulting in the amended scope
bearing little resemblance to the actual language of the law,” the
majority wrote. 49 “Such a judicial rewrite encroaches on the
authority of the legislative body that crafted the provision and
enters the realm of vagueness because any person who reads it
would lack fair notice of what is legal and what constitutes a
crime.” 50
Such First Amendment obstacles extend to state efforts to
combat revenge pornography. For instance, Texas enacted a
revenge pornography statute that provides:
A person commits an offense if:
(1) without the effective consent of
the depicted person, the person
intentionally
discloses
visual
material depicting another person
with the person's intimate parts

44
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Id. at 9.
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Id. at 7.
48
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exposed or engaged in sexual
conduct;
(2) the visual material was obtained
by the person or created under
circumstances in which the
depicted person had a reasonable
expectation that the visual material
would remain private;
(3) the disclosure of the visual
material causes harm to the
depicted person; and
(4) the disclosure of the visual
material reveals the identity of the
depicted person in any manner[.] 51
The statute defines “intimate parts” as “the naked
genitals, pubic area, anus, buttocks, or female nipple of a
person.” 52 It defines “visual material” as “any film, photograph,
videotape, negative, or slide or any photographic reproduction
that contains or incorporates in any manner any film,
photograph, videotape, negative, or slide” 53 and “any disk,
diskette, or other physical medium that allows an image to be
displayed on a computer or other video screen and any image
transmitted to a computer or other video screen by telephone
line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method.” 54
The constitutionality of this statute soon came under
question when Jordan Bartlett Jones, who was charged under the
statute, facially challenged the law as a First Amendment
violation. 55 The trial court rejected his pretrial argument, but in
April 2018, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed. 56 The court
concluded that the ban was a content-based speech regulation,
requiring strict scrutiny. 57 Texas argued that the law survived
strict scrutiny because the government had a compelling interest
in protecting individuals’ privacy. 58 The Court found particularly
“problematic” the application of the law to either visual material

51

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b) (West 2017).
Id. § 21.16(a)(1).
53
Id. § 21.16(a)(5)(A).
54
Id. § 21.16(a)(5)(B).
55
Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888 (Tex. App. Apr. 18,
2018).
56
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“obtained by the person” or “created under circumstances in
which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that the
visual material would remain private.” 59 To illustrate its problem
with the wide range of potentially covered materials, the Court
provided a hypothetical:
Adam and Barbara are in a
committed
relationship.
One
evening, in their home, during a
moment of passion, Adam asks
Barbara if he can take a nude
photograph of her. Barbara
consents, but before Adam takes the
picture, she tells him that he must
not show the photograph to anyone
else. Adam promises that he will
never show the picture to another
living soul, and takes a photograph
of Barbara in front of a plain, white
background with her breasts
exposed.
A few months pass, and Adam and
Barbara break up after Adam
discovers that Barbara has had an
affair. A few weeks later, Adam
rediscovers the topless photo he
took of Barbara. Feeling angry and
betrayed, Adam emails the photo
without comment to several of his
friends, including Charlie. Charlie
never had met Barbara and,
therefore, does not recognize her.
But he likes the photograph and
forwards the email without
comment to some of his friends, one
of whom, unbeknownst to Charlie,
is Barbara’s coworker, Donna.
Donna recognizes Barbara and
shows the picture to Barbara’s
supervisor,
who
terminates
Barbara’s employment. 60

59
60

Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b) (West 2017)).
Id.
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Chief Justice James T. Worthen, writing for the panel,
wrote that Charlie and Donna—in addition to Adam—could be
liable under Texas’s law. 61 Charlie, he wrote, “had no reason to
know that the photograph was created under circumstances
under which Barbara had a reasonable expectation that the
photograph would remain private.” 62 Although the charges
against Jones only involved images that he allegedly obtained,
the Court sought an extreme hypothetical to justify a facial
invalidation of the law. 63 In September 2018, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals agreed to hear an appeal of the ruling. 64
The rulings from North Carolina, New York, and Texas
demonstrate the significant limitations that legislatures face
when they enact laws intended to penalize perpetrators of
cyberbullying, revenge pornography, and other similar acts.
Even if the laws appear to be tailored to protect a compelling
interest, they may overreach into other speech. Of course, if
legislatures draft their laws too narrowly, they might not fully
address the harms.
D. Free Speech or Equality?
It is difficult to read these court opinions without thinking
about the criticisms of First Amendment protections for
pornography advanced by Catharine Mackinnon. Working with
Andrea Dworkin, MacKinnon had convinced Indianapolis to
prohibit certain types of trafficking in pornography. 65 Dworkin,
MacKinnon, and other supporters of the ban argued that
pornography led to the suppression of women, encouraging men
to treat women as sexual objects. 66 The Seventh Circuit struck
down the ordinance as a First Amendment violation. 67 “Speech
treating women in the approved way — in sexual encounters
‘premised on equality’ — is lawful no matter how sexually
explicit,” Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote. 68 “Speech treating
women in the disapproved way — as submissive in matters
sexual or as enjoying humiliation — is unlawful no matter how
significant the literary, artistic, or political qualities of the work
taken as a whole. The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints

61

Id.
Id.
63
See id.
64
Chuck Lindell, Court to Decide If Texas Can Enforce ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, STATESMAN
(Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.statesman.com/news/20180725/court-to-decide-iftexas-can-enforce-revenge-porn-law.
65
Am. Bookseller’s Ass’n v. Hudnet, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985).
66
Id. at 325.
67
Id.
68
Id.
62
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in this way.” 69 MacKinnon rejected Easterbrook’s comparison of
the Indianapolis ordinance to restrictions on political speech. 70
“Behind his First Amendment façade, women were being
transformed into ideas, sexual traffic in whom was protected as
if it were a discussion, the men uninhibited and robust, the
women wide-open,” MacKinnon wrote. 71 “Judge Easterbrook
did not say this law was not a sex discrimination law, but he gave
the state interest it therefore served—opposition to sex
inequality—no constitutional weight.” 72
Just as MacKinnon and Dworkin faced insurmountable
First Amendment barriers in their attempts to restrict
pornography, so to do people who seek to reduce the amount of
cyberbullying, revenge pornography, and other types of harmful
online speech. By restricting speech, they inevitably will
encounter First Amendment objections that likely will limit their
efforts.
However, the First Amendment is not the only reason
that cyber-harms cannot be addressed purely through
retrospective penalties. There is another significant barrier to
relying on victims to file lawsuits or bring criminal charges: the
immense personal toll of reliving a traumatic experience. As
Danielle Citron aptly summarized:
Victims are often reluctant to sue
privacy invaders because they do
not want to further expose their
lives to them. As David Bateman
and Elisa D’Amico (who represent
victims
of
nonconsensual
pornography on a pro bono basis)
have explained, victims often fear
the exposure that discovery
inevitably entails. They do not want
their medical records revealed to
their attackers. They are anxious
about sitting across from their
abusers during a deposition. It is not
hard to see why many victims do
not sue privacy invaders. 73

69

Id.
CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 98 (1993).
71
Id.
72
Id.
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See Danielle K. Citron, Sexual Privacy, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019).
70
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Laws that penalize people for revenge pornography and
cyberbullying play an important role in combatting cyber-harms
to the person. However, these backward-looking laws have
limits. In some cases, the laws as applied or facially will be struck
down as unconstitutional. And, even when the cases do not fail
on constitutional grounds, civil litigants or prosecutors face
significant burdens to demonstrate harm that already has
occurred. While these laws are integral in combatting online
harassment, they should not be the only part of the equation. We
need to look at prophylactic legal measures that stop these
wrongs from occurring in the first place. As the above cases
demonstrate, our current laws are woefully inadequate.
II. A BROADER CONCEPTION OF CYBERSECURITY LAW
Despite the efforts of legislators, prosecutors, and
litigants, civil litigation and criminal prosecution only addresses
one aspect of cyber-harms to individuals. These punitive
measures not only face constitutional challenges, but they largely
penalize behavior after the harm has occurred. In addition to
these retrospective laws, we should consider how to best align
prospective cybersecurity laws to reduce the likelihood of these
cyber threats. In other words, legislatures have determined when
and how to punish certain types of online behavior. The next step
is to figure out how the law might prevent this behavior from
occurring in the first place.
The United States has very few laws that explicitly use the
term “cybersecurity.” This is likely because many cybersecurityrelated laws were enacted decades ago, before the term
“cybersecurity” was commonplace. 74 This Part provides an
overview of the statutes that broadly fall underneath the umbrella
of cybersecurity, analyzes the harms that they seek to protect
against, and explains how they could better protect individuals
from the types of harms outlined in Part I.
A. Notification Laws
The first general category of cybersecurity laws are
statutes that require companies to notify individuals, regulators,
and credit bureaus of data breaches. The United States does not
have a national data breach notice law; instead, every state and
the District of Columbia has enacted its own statute that requires

74

See Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1010 (2018)
(“[T]here are a number of U.S. state and federal statutes, regulations, and court
opinions regarding data security, hacking, and related issues that address some
aspects associated with cybersecurity law.”).
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notification in certain circumstances. 75 The laws are triggered
only if there is unauthorized access to “personal information.” 76
All of the statutes include in their definition of personal
information an individual’s name in combination with at least
one of the following: social security number, driver’s license or
state identification number, or full financial account number. 77
Some states protect additional categories of data; North Dakota,
for instance, includes birth date and mother’s maiden name in its
definition of “personal information.” 78 Maryland’s breach notice
law, passed in 2007 but updated in 2017, also includes health
insurance account numbers and biometric identifiers. 79 Although
some states, like Maryland, are gradually updating their breach
notification to reflect more modern threats, the breach notice
statutes are largely a creature of the few years after California
became the first state to pass a breach notice law. Although
crimes such as revenge pornography and online harassment
existed at the time, 80 regulators and the media were heavily
focused on identity theft and financial crimes with amendments
to the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 2003. 81
What do data breach notification laws not cover? For
starters, they do not require individuals to be notified of the
disclosure of information that could be used to stalk, harass, or
dox them. Let’s say that a company is breached and a list of its
customers’ names, home addresses, work addresses, personal
email addresses, and home phone numbers is disclosed. No state
breach notification law requires companies to notify the
individuals, law enforcement, or regulators about that disclosure.
Of course, such a breach would be less likely to be used for
financial fraud than, say, the disclosure of a Social Security
number. However, such information could—and is—used not
only for directly sending threats, but to launch systematic online
harassment campaigns. For instance, in October 2018, a
Washington D.C. man was arrested for posting on Wikipedia the
home addresses, phone numbers, mobile phone numbers, and
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See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
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Id.
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See id.
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N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01–51-30-03 (2017).
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MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501–3503.
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See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing a case of
revenge pornography that occurred in 2004).
81
See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Committed to Fighting
Identity Theft (Dec. 15, 2003).

2019]

CYBERSECURITY OF THE PERSON

359

email addresses of three United States senators. 82 It is unclear
how he obtained the information, but such contact details are not
typically available to the public. Had he obtained the data via a
breach of a public company, that company would be under no
legal obligation to notify the senators or law enforcement unless
the breach also included protected information such as Social
Security numbers or driver’s license information.
In addition to the narrow definition of personal
information, most state data breach notification laws also
contain “risk of harm” thresholds, which allow a company to
avoid notifying if it determines that the breach does not pose a
serious risk of harm to individuals. As with the definition of
personal information, these thresholds are typically focused on
financial harm. For instance, Ohio’s breach notification law is
triggered only if the unauthorized access and acquisition of data
“causes or reasonably is believed will cause a material risk of
identity theft or other fraud to the resident.” 83 While the term
“other fraud” might be charitably read to include some types of
harassment, the wording suggests that the statute is more focused
on notifying individuals who are at risk of financial harms such
as identity theft.
Breach notification laws should require companies to
notify individuals of the unauthorized disclosure of non-public
information that could be used to harm them. In addition to
requiring notification regarding financial information and data
that could be used for identity theft, the laws should notify
individuals of unauthorized disclosure of information about their
families, home addresses, personal phone numbers, and any
other details that could be used to intimidate, harass, or threaten.
The notification laws also should reach beyond the
concept of data breaches, and cover other compromises that
could lead to harm to an individual. For instance, if the maker of
an Internet-connected camera discovers a vulnerability that
allows unauthorized parties to access video feeds, that
manufacturer should face an obligation to notify individuals of
the problem and help them to patch it.
B. Data Security Laws
Another category of laws that generally falls into the
category of cybersecurity are data security requirements. The
United States does not have a single general law, at the federal
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See Katherine Tully-McManus, Suspect in Congressional Doxxing Cases Arrested, ROLL
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level, that sets data security standards. The closest thing that the
United States has to a general data security and privacy regulator
is the Federal Trade Commission, but its legal authority is
limited. The FTC does not have explicit authority to regulate
cybersecurity. Instead, it claims data security enforcement
authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.” 84 The FTC challenges data security
practices as deceptive if companies have misrepresented how
they secure data. 85 Under the statute, an act is “unfair” if it
“causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.” 86 Although the FTC has issued informal guidance
as to the types of data security practices that might be “unfair,” 87
it does not have formal rulemaking authority for data security.
In addition to the lack of specificity, the FTC’s data security
enforcement authority falls short because it typically enters into
consent decrees with companies, requiring some changes to
security practices but not levying a monetary fine for a first
violation. Contrast this with Europe’s General Data Protection
Regulation, which penalizes companies up to 4 percent of global
annual revenues or 20 million Euros, whichever is greater. 88
More stringent data security requirements are found in
some federal sector-specific laws. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
allows federal financial regulators to set standards for regulated
financial institutions. 89 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 allows the Department of Health and
Human Services to regulate the data security of health plans,
healthcare clearinghouses, healthcare providers, and their
business associates. 90 Although protecting financial and
healthcare data is crucial to privacy values, these laws are limited
only to particular types of businesses. Even though health data
could be used to blackmail or harass an individual, many types
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of companies that might hold individuals’ health data are not
necessarily covered by HIPAA’s rigorous requirements.
C. Personal Information Security
In addition to these sector-specific laws, about a dozen
states have enacted general data security laws that apply to the
personal information of their residents. Most of these statutes do
not have terribly specific requirements; for instance, Indiana’s
data security statute requires that a company that owns a data
base with personal information of Indiana residents “implement
and maintain reasonable procedures, including taking any
appropriate corrective action, to protect and safeguard from
unlawful use or disclosure any personal information of Indiana
residents collected or maintained by the data base owner.” 91
Massachusetts has the most detailed general data security
requirements, with its regulations spelling out the specific
components of written information security plans that
companies must adopt. 92 Massachusetts also requires specific
technological safeguards, such as “reasonable monitoring of
systems” and “encryption of all transmitted records and files
containing personal information that will travel across public
networks.” 93
The primary shortcoming of these state laws is that they
adopt the narrow definition of personal information seen in the
data breach notification laws. For instance, the Massachusetts
data security regulation only protects “personal information,”
which it defines as
a Massachusetts resident’s first
name and last name or first initial
and last name in combination with
any one or more of the following
data elements that relate to such
resident: (a) Social Security
number; (b) driver’s license number
or state-issued identification card
number; or (c) financial account
number, or credit or debit card
number, with or without any
required security code, access code,
personal identification number or
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password, that would permit access
to a resident’s financial account. 94
The Massachusetts regulations do not apply to
“information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available
information, or from federal, state or local government records
lawfully made available to the general public.” 95
The Massachusetts regulation does not require
companies to protect a wide swath of personal information about
Massachusetts residents, such as information that could be used
to stalk, harass, or embarrass them. Like the breach notification
laws, it is an outgrowth of the concern over financial harm and
does not adequately address the harms to individuals that
increasingly encountered online.
D. Protecting the “Internet of Things”
Both the data security and breach notice laws also largely
fail to account from the growing threat of attacks on connected
devices. Known as the “Internet of Things,” everyday devices
connected to the Internet are proliferating, driven in part by the
shift in the Internet Protocol system to IPv6 that has increased
the number of IP addresses available. 96 Internet of Things
connects everything from cars to webcams to refrigerators. With
the new technological benefits come new risks. In 2015, the FTC
staff spoke with security and industry experts and issued a report
on Internet of Things privacy and security issues. The staff
concluded that the connected devices “may present a variety of
potential security risks that could be exploited to harm
consumers by: (1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of
personal information; (2) facilitating attacks on other systems;
and (3) creating safety risks.” 97 Indeed, connected devices are
notoriously insecure. This lack of security can lead to personal
harms such as sextortion. For instance, the Brookings report on
sextortion found that although some of the extortion involved
images obtained without authorization from individuals’
computers or social media accounts, some involved “the actual
hacking of their computers and the remote controlling of their
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webcams.” 98 As the Brookings report concluded, webcams are
“often insecure and offer sextortionists and other bad cyber
actors literal visibility into the activity of non-consenting targets.
Similarly, relatively lax password controls—and relatively
simple password recovery—on social media platforms makes
hacking accounts too easy.” 99
Only one state—California—has attempted to address
Internet of Things security, passing a law in 2018 that requires
connected device manufacturers to adopt “reasonable” security
features that are (1) “[a]ppropriate to the nature and function of
the device,” (2) “[a]ppropriate to the information it may collect,
contain, or transmit,” and (3) “[d]esigned to protect the device
and any information contained therein from unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” 100 While
the new law is well-intentioned, it does not provide specific
guidance as to the technical measures that manufacturers should
take to secure connected devices. It only states that if the device
can authenticate outside of a local network, the manufacturer
should ensure that either “[t]he preprogrammed password is
unique to each device manufactured” or “[t]he device contains a
security feature that requires a user to generate a new means of
authentication before access is granted to the device for the first
time.” 101 Although this requirement is a good start, as security
expert Robert Graham has written, it only addresses one of many
vulnerabilities in Internet of Things devices. 102
III. MATCHING LAWS TO THE HARMS
To better align cybersecurity laws with the harms to
individuals, this Article provides six recommendations for
lawmakers to consider. As I argue in a forthcoming article in
Wake Forest Law Review, such reforms should, when possible,
occur at the federal level, given the inherently interstate nature
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of cybersecurity and the benefits of uniform requirements for
service providers, manufacturers, and other companies:
This uncoordinated regulatory
approach is ill-suited to any field,
and particularly to one as vital as
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity
regulation is determined by more
than 7,000 state legislators, and
enforced by 50 governors and 50
state attorneys general, and their
staffs. This bouillabaisse of state
cybersecurity laws makes it
impossible for the United States to
develop a cohesive strategy to
secure itself from increasingly
persistent and advanced cyber
threats.
Although
new
cybersecurity threats emerge daily,
many state cybersecurity laws are
more than a decade old and have
not changed, addressing the threats
of the mid-aughts rather than
today. 103
First, companies should be required to notify individuals
not only of breaches of their social security numbers and
financial account information, but also of any personal data that
reasonably could be contemplated of causing harm to their
person or reputation. Because this conceivably could include
data such as home address, email address, and private
communications, this should be defined broadly. The United
States should consider a definition of covered “personal data”
that is in line with the General Data Protection Regulation in
Europe: “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.” 104
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This definition is not narrowly tied to a particular type of harm,
and ensures that individuals (and regulators) will be aware of
potential harms. Risk of harm thresholds for notifications should
consider not only risks of economic harm, but also harm to
individuals’ privacy, safety, and reputation.
Second, companies should face specific and rigorous
requirements to secure a similarly broad swath of personal data.
Data security threats evolve at a rapid pace, as do the safeguards
that best protect against these threats. For both political and
practical reasons, legislatures cannot keep up with the new
technological developments. If Congress passes a national data
security law, it should delegate rulemaking authority to an expert
agency, likely the FTC. The agency’s experts could promulgate
regulations that set forth specific requirements for safeguarding
this more broadly defined category of personal information.
Third, just as companies are required to notify individuals
of breaches of their personal information, Internet of Things
device manufacturers and service providers should be obligated
to notify individuals upon discovery of vulnerabilities that could
compromise their privacy, security, or safety. For instance, if a
webcam manufacturer learns of a vulnerability that could allow
hackers to surreptitiously record people, the manufacturer
should face a specific requirement—outside of general tort
liability—to inform users and help remediate the problem.
Fourth, data security requirements should evolve to more
comprehensively cover cybersecurity. These requirements
should cover not only personal information, but also the security
of devices, systems, and networks. California’s Internet of
Things statute is a good first step, but a more comprehensive bill
at the national level would address issues beyond password
security, and would allow for regulations that require more
specific and effective technological safeguards. To be sure, a
number of cyber-related harms are caused by compromises of
data confidentiality, however, as seen with cases such as the
hijacking of webcams, cybersecurity reaches beyond mere data
breaches.
Fifth, the government should collaborate with service
providers and other companies to crack down on cyberharassment, sextortion, and similar acts. The FBI and state and
local law enforcement may be best positioned to understand
how, for instance, sextortionists remotely hijack webcams. Just
as the Department of Homeland Security, through US-CERT,
shares information with companies regarding botnets and
software vulnerabilities, the government should work with
service providers to ensure that they are aware of emerging
threats that target individuals (such as IP addresses associated
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with bad actors, tools that they use to carry out their acts, and
vulnerabilities that they exploit).
Sixth, once cybersecurity is viewed as more than an
economic threat, but also a threat to individual safety, the nation
could begin more comprehensive efforts to educate the public
about cybersecurity. Beginning in elementary school and lasting
into adulthood, individuals should be educated about online
safety and methods to reduce the likelihood of falling victim to a
cybercriminal. Although there are some steps to educate the
public, such as the October National Cybersecurity Awareness
Month, cybersecurity should be an integral part of classroom
education, and it should receive the same level of attention from
law enforcement as non-digital crimes and wrongdoings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nearly two decades ago, state legislatures recognized that
identity theft and other economic crimes required laws to protect
data security. As individuals continue to be victimized online,
we need to reimagine cybersecurity laws to address these broader
harms. Cybersecurity laws should protect a wider range of data,
and they should require manufacturers and service providers to
adopt safeguards that protect individuals. To be sure, we cannot
rely on cybersecurity law alone to prevent harms to individuals.
Like retrospective tort lawsuits and criminal prosecution,
cybersecurity laws only address part of the problem. However,
cybersecurity should be one part of a more comprehensive longterm strategy to make the Internet safer for all.

